Komentarz do Bawa meci’a 8:11

השואל את הפרה ושאל בעלה עמה – if the owners of the cow were with the borrower to do his work, whether they were borrowed with him or rented, whether at the same work of the cow, or whether to do a different [kind of] work, and if the animal died, he is exempt.

Introduction The first mishnah of chapter eight deals with a specific law which is applicable only to borrowers: if the owners were rented or borrowed with their animals, for instance a donkey driver with his donkey, then the borrowers or renters are not obligated if the animal should die. Mishnah two deals with a person who rents an animal for half a day and borrows it for the other half.

שנאמר אם בעליו עמו לא ישלם – and this implies if the owner of the ox was with it, with the borrower, and is borrowed or rented to him to do work at the time that he borrowed his cow, he doesn’t pay.

If one borrowed a cow together with the service of its owner, or hired its owner together with the cow, or if he borrowed the service of the owner or hired him, and afterward borrowed the cow, and the cowed died he is not liable, for it is written, “If its owner was with it no restitution need be made” (Exodus 22:14). But if he first borrowed the cow and afterward borrowed or hired the service of its owner, and the cow died, he is liable, for it is written, “Its owner not being with it, he must make restitution” (Exodus 22:13). The Torah clearly states that if the owner of the animal was with the animal when it was borrowed and then it died or was injured the borrower is not obligated to make restitution. The assumption is that the owners should have taken care of the animal and therefore even though the borrower would normally be liable for the animal dying or being injured in this case he is not. Our mishnah clarifies two issues. First of all, it states that the services of the owner need not have been borrowed but may have been hired as well. As long as the cow is borrowed these laws will be applicable. Second, the services of the owner must have been borrowed or hired before the borrowing of the cow. The Rabbis interpret the Torah’s words “with it” or “not being with it” to mean that the owner was in service to the borrower at the time of the borrowing and not afterwards. If the borrower hired or borrowed the services of the owner after having borrowed the cow he will be liable if the cow dies, even if at that time the owner was with the cow.

אבל שאל את הפרה כו' – if it was with him at the time of an unavoidable accident, but was not with him at the time of the borrowing, he (i.e., the borrower) is liable, for it was not borrowing with the owners to make him exempt other than if he was with him at the time of the borrowing.

Questions for Further Thought:
Mishnah one: Why might the Rabbis have interpreted the verses in Exodus 22:13-14 in this way and not in a more literal manner?

שנאמר בעליו אין עמו שלם ישלם – And this is what Scripture teaches us: If the owner is not with it (i.e., the animal) at the time of the borrowing, even if he was with him (i.e., the animal) at the time of breaking a bone or death, he (i.e., the borrower) must surely pay.

המשאיל אומר שאולה מתה – and you are liable for its unavoidable accidents.

If one borrowed a cow, and borrowed it for half a day and hired it for half a day; or borrowed it for one day and hired it for the next; or if he borrowed one cow, and hired another and the cow died if he that lent the cow says: “It was the borrowed cow that died”, [or] “On the day when it was borrowed it died”, [or] “During the time when it was borrowed it died” and the other one says: “I don’t know”, (1) he is liable. If the hirer says, “It is the hired one that died”, [or] “On the day when it was hired it died”, and the other says, “I do not know”, (1) he is not liable. If the one says, “It was borrowed”, and the other says, “It was hired”, (1) the hirer must take an oath that it was the hired one that died. If the one says, “I do not know”, and the other says, “I do not know”, (1) they share in the loss. There are three possible scenarios mentioned in this mishnah 1) Shimon borrows from Reuven a cow for half a day and rents the same cow for the other half of the day; 2) Shimon borrows the cow for one day and hires it on the next day; 3) Shimon borrows from Reuven one cow and rents a different cow. If the cow should die a natural death it will be in Shimon’s best interest that the cow died while it was being hired, since a hirer does not pay in cases of natural death. It will be in Reuven’s best interest if the cow died while being borrowed since borrowers do pay in cases of natural death. Our mishnah delineates the possible claims of Reuven and Shimon and the law in each case. Case a: If Reuven, who lent the cow, claims that he is certain that the cow died while being rented or that the rented cow died and Shimon claims that he doesn’t know, Shimon is liable. This goes according to the general principle that one who claims that he is certain has a stronger claim then one who claims he is not certain (see Steinsaltz reference guide, page 172. Case b: Similarly, if Shimon claims that he is sure that the cow died while being borrowed or that the borrowed cow died and Reuven claims that he does not know, Shimon is exempt. Since Shimon is certain that the borrowed cow died and Reuven doesn’t know, Shimon’s claim is stronger. Case c: If they disagree and each claims that he is certain, Shimon takes an oath that it died while it was being hired and he is exempt from making restitution. This is based on the principle that the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff. Since in this case Reuven is the plaintiff and he cannot prove his claim, Shimon is exempt. Case d: If both claim that they are uncertain then they split the loss of the cow. In this case Shimon will pay Reuven half the value of the cow.

איני יודע – lest it died while rented out, and am exempt from the unavoidable accidents.

חייב – It is not possible to establish our Mishnah as it implies, for we hold that my Maneh is in your hands, and the other says, that he doesn’t know [how the animal died] and he takes an equitable oath (see Shevuot 40b – which is applied, if one who is sued for a debt, denies the latter entirely, in contradistinction to the legal oath which is required when the defendant admits a part of the claim. It being presumed that nobody will go to law unless he has a claim, it is a matter of equity to put the opponent to an oath, to which he may in return put the claimant) that he does not know [how the animal died – if it had been borrowed or tented] and is exempt from payment/penalty. For this reason, we establish in the Gemara (Bava Metzia 98a) that where there is the business of an oath that is Torah mandated between them, such as where [the lender] says to him: I transferred to you two cows, one day as borrowed and the other day as a rental, and both of them (i.e., the cows) died while they were borrowed. And the borrower said to him (i.e., the lender), one of them, yes, at the time while it was borrowed it died. But one of them (i.e., the cows), I don’t know. And this like someone who partially admits to the claim and he is liable for an oath. And because he cannot take an oath, he pays. And it is similar to [the case of] my Maneh is in your hands, and the other responds, How is this? Fifty (i.e., one-half) I know about and fifty (i.e., the other half) I don’t know [anything] about. He is required to take an oath but he is not able to take an oath, and because he is unable to take an oath, he must pay.

ישבע השוכר ששכורה מתה – this also is impossible to establish as it implies. And we hold that if one claimed “wheat” and the other admitted to him “barley,” he is exempt even from the cost of the barley. And that is so – that what he admitted to him was not what the other claimed, and what he claimed he (i.e., the other) did not admit to him. And what place is there for an oath? For this we have established in the Gemara (Bava Metzia 98b – a “rolling oath.” The lender can plea: “Even on your own plea, you must still swear that the animal died naturally, not through your negligence” – which rejects the ruling of Rami bar Hama’s ruling that no oath is imposed at all upon bailees, even when they plead loss, theft, death, etc., unless there is also a partial rejection of the claim. The bailee is bound to swear another oath – that the hired one and not the borrowed one has died is administered. The superimposed oath is Biblical, not Rabbinic. See also Sotah 18a). In that he (i.e., the lender/person who rents out the animal) says to the borrower/renter: Swear to me the oath of the bailees that you are required to swear, that she (i.e., the animal) died naturally, for the deponent’s statement is accepted as true on the ground that, if he had intended to tell a lie, he might have invented one more advantageous to his cause – that he could have taken an other that it died naturally for if he made a claim also that via a rolling oath, that she died while rented out.

יחלוקו – Our Mishnah is [according to] Sumachus, who stated that monies that are placed in doubt should be divided, and it is not the Halakha, for the Halakha is: “He who wants to exact [compensation] from his fellow bears the burden of proof” (see Mishnah Bava Kamma, Chapter 3, Mishnah 11), and the the one appealed to must take an oath that he doesn’t know and is exempt.

ביד בנו – The lender sent it to the borrower by the hand of his son or his servant or the agent of the lender.

If one borrowed a cow and the owner sent it by the hand of his son or his slave or his agent, or by the hand of the borrower’s son or slave or agent and it died [on the way], the borrower is not liable.
But if the borrower said, “Send it to me by the hand of my son or my slave or my agent, or by the hand of your son or your slave or your agent”, or if the lender said, “I am sending it to you by the hand of my son or my slave or my agent”, or “by the hand of your son or your slave or your agent”, and the borrower said, “Send it”, and he sent it and it died [on the way], the borrower is liable.
So, too, when the cow is returned.
Mishnah three deals with a lender who uses an agent to deliver the object to be borrowed to the borrower.
Mishnah four deals with disputes in sales where it is either unknown whether the cow being sold gave birth before it was sold (in which case the calf belongs to the seller) or after it was sold (in which case the calf belongs to the buyer). Similarly this mishnah deals with a dispute between a buyer and a seller over which field or slave was sold, the larger or the smaller one.
The issue in this mishnah is the liability of the borrower during the time when the borrowed animal is being delivered from the lender to the borrower. If the lender sent it with a third party, be it his own son, slave or agent or even the borrower’s son, slave or agent, without being asked to do so by the borrower then the borrower is not liable for the animal until it reaches him. The borrower can say to the lender that he did not agree to accept liability until the animal reached his hand.
If, however, the borrower requested that the lender send the object with someone else or the lender told him that he was going to do so and the borrower agreed, then the borrower is liable for the object as soon as the animal leaves the hand of the lender. Since the borrower agreed that the animal could be delivered by a third party, it is as if he has accepted responsibility immediately.
All that was stated in the previous part of the mishnah is also true at the time when the animal is being returned. If the borrower sends the animal back through a third party without being asked he is responsible for the animal until it reaches the lender. If, however, the lender told him to return it through a third party or the borrower told him that he was returning it through a third party and the lender agreed, from the moment it leaves his hands the borrower is no longer liable for the animal.

או ביד בנו ועבדו ושלוחו של שואל – he (i.e. the borrower) is exempt if it (i.e. the animal) died on the road [to him/her]. But that agent of the borrower, one can establish it (see Bava Kamma 104a – also Shevuot 46b) – regarding his hired laborer or his client who lives in his home (may they take the oath)? But he did not make this person an agent before witnesses, for if witnesses had made the person the agent, the borrower would be obligated for his (i.e., the agent’s) unavoidable accident when the lender transferred it (i.e., the animal) to him. But there are those who say that even if he (i.e., the borrower) made the person his agent before witnesses, he is not liable through his hand for unavoidable accidents. And this is what he says to him – that a person is [deemed] believable if he wishes to send it in his hands, he sends it.

אמר לו השואל שלחה לי וכו' – in the hand of your servant, he (i.e., the borrower) is liable. This “your servant’ is speaking about a Hebrew slave, for it were a Canaanite slave, the hand of the slave is like the hand of the master, and it would be like he didn’t depart from the domain of the lender, and it would be like the lender himself walked to him, and the borrower would be exempt, if he suffered an unavoidable accident on the way.

וכן בשעה שמחזירה – If the borrower sent it in the hand of his son, or his servant or his gent, or in the hand of the son, slave or agent of the lender, it did not leave the domain of the the borrower juntil it comes to the hand of the lender, and if he suffers an unavoidable accident on the way, he is liable. If the lender said to him (i.e., the borrower): “Send it to me,” or the borrower said, “Behold I am sending it, et.” And the lender said to him, “Send it,” and he sent it (i.e., the animal) and it suffered an unavoidable accident on the way, he is exempt [from having to make any payments). And our Mishnah specifically when he returns it amidst the days of his borrowing it (i.e., the animal) when he is liable for unavoidable accidents. But if he returned it after the days of his borrowing, the law of a paid bailee applies [since he derived benefit from it] and not the law of a borrower, and if he sent it by the hand of his son, or his servant ,or his agent, whether it was his or it belonged to the lender, and it suffered an unavoidable accident, he is exempt [from payment].

המוכר שפחתו וילדה – since a Canaanite slave is acquired by money, and when he gave the money, he acquired the female [Canaanite] slave in every place that she is. And if it is not known if until she gave birth he gave the money, and the fetus us his, or after she gave birth, and the child belongs to the owners. But a cow is not acquired by money, but by pulling/drawing the object to be acquired towards oneself, and since he pulled it, it would be known if she gave birth already or not given birth, and for this [reason], it was necessary for the Mishnah to teach, “he who exchanges,” for via “Halifin”/a form of possession by handing to the purchaser an object as a symbolical substitute, since when one draws the object to be acquired towards oneself, the other person acquires in whatever place he is in, therefore it is not known whether the animal gave birth or not.

The principles learned in this mishnah are strikingly similar to those learned in mishnah two of this chapter, so it may help to look at the explanation to that mishnah as well. Basically, the mishnah teaches that when two people are both certain about a claim (and there is no corroborating evidence) they split the disputed amount. The caveat to this rule is that if there is a previous assumption of possession favoring one of the parties, the other party must prove his claim in order to win the dispute. If one party claims that he is certain and the other party that he is unsure, the one who claims certainty wins the dispute. If both are uncertain they also split the disputed amount. We will now go through the examples in this mishnah.

יחלוקו – And our Mishnah is according to Sumachos, but the Halakha is not according to him.

If one swapped a cow for a donkey, and it gave birth, So too if one sold his slave and she gave birth, [And] one (the says, “It was born before I sold her”, and the other (the says, “It was born after I bought her”, they shall divide [the value of what was born]. If this scenario a person exchanged a donkey for a cow and the cow gave birth but it is unknown when it gave birth. The one who acquired the cow will claim that the cow gave birth after the swap and therefore the calf belongs to him, and the one who gave his cow will claim that the birth was prior to the swap and therefore the young cow belongs to him. In this case, since there is no previous assumption of ownership over the young cow, the two parties split its value. The same principle is true if the seller sold a female slave and the dispute is over when she gave birth, before or after the sale.

זה אומר גדול וזה אומר קטן – The one says the monetary value of a large slave and the other one says the monetary value of a small slave. For it were an actual slave, we hold that we don’t take oaths on slaves. And furthermore, what he claimed against him, he did not admit to him and what he (i.e. the other) admitted to, he (i.e., the first) did not claim, and there was no place for an oath.

If one had two slaves, one large and the other small, or two fields, one large and the other small,[And he sold one of them], If the buyer says, “I bought the large one” and the other says, “I don’t know”, the buyer can rightly claim the large one. If the seller said, “I sold the small one” and the buyer said, “I do not know”, he may only take the small one. If one said, “It was the large one” and the other said, “It was the small one”, the seller must take an oath that it was the small one that he sold [and the buyer can only take the small one]. If one said, “I do not know”, and the other said, “I do not know”, they shall divide the value [of both slaves or fields]. In this scenario a person sold one of two slaves or fields to his friend, and the two parties are disputing whether it the larger or smaller slave or field was sold. There are four possibilities for the two claims. 1) If they buyer claims that he is certain that he bought the large one and the seller is uncertain which he sold, the buyer gets the large one. 2) If the seller claims that he is certain that he sold the small one and the buyer is uncertain, the buyer receives only the small one. 3) If they are both certain then the seller must take an oath that he sold the small one and the buyer only receives the small one. 4) If both are uncertain they split the value of both of the fields or both of the slaves.

Questions for Further Thought:
Mishnah four: In section one and section 2iii, both parties claim certainty. Nevertheless in section one they split the value and in section 2iii, the seller takes an oath and the buyer gets only the smaller field or slave. Why is the law in these two sections different? What is essentially different about the two situations?

המוכר זיתיו לעצים – to cut them down to burn them and he detained them in the ground.

If one sold his olive trees as firewood and they bore fruit that gave less than a quarter-log of oil per seah, this belongs to the [new] owner of the olive trees. If they bore fruit that gave a quarter-log of oil [or more] per seah, and the one said, “It was my trees that produced it”, and the other said, “It was my land that produced it”, let them share the produce.
If a flood washed away a man’s olive trees and set them in the midst of his fellow’s field [where they bore fruit], and the one said, “It was my trees that produced it”, and the other said, “It was my land that produced it”, let them share the produce.
Mishnah five deals with a situation where one sold olive trees to another person to cut them down as firewood, but he did not sell the land. The issue is to whom do the olives belong: to the one who owns the trees or to the one who owns the land.
Mishnah six begins to discuss the laws of renting, a topic which will be discussed from now until the end of the tractate. The first topic of discussion is the renting of houses and specifically the laws of eviction.
The scenario in section one of our mishnah is that Reuven sold his olive trees to Shimon but did not sell him the land. The intent was for Shimon to cut down the trees and use them as firewood. However, before Shimon did so the olive trees bore some olives with which it was possible to make olive oil. If the olive oil was of a poor quality, in other words it came from olives that produced less than a quarter-log of oil per seah, then the owner of the trees can keep the oil. Since there is not much oil and it is of a low quality, we can safely assume that Reuven does not care about it and therefore Shimon may keep it. However, if the trees produce a better quality and higher quantity of olive oil there may be a dispute. Reuven may justly claim that the olives grew from his ground and Shimon may justly claim that they grew from his tree. In such a case they split the value of the olive oil.
The scenario in section two is different from that in section one but it has the same law. In this case Reuven’s trees were washed up in a flood and landed on Shimon’s property where they took root and bore fruit. Again, Reuven claims that his trees bore the fruit and Shimon that his land bore the fruit. Again, they split the value of the oil.

ועשו – bad olives for a Seah of them did not produce one-quarter of a log of oil.

הרי אלו של בעל הזיתים – for less than one-fourth [of a log] people aren’t strict/particular about it. Ands the one-quarter that they mentioned, outside of the removal which he takes out at their olive harvest and at their pressing. And our Mishnah [deals with] when he sells his olives to merely cut them down. But if he said to him to cut them down immediately, even less than one-quarter [of a Log of oil per Seah] to the owner of the field. But if he said to cut them when he would desire, even more than one-quarter [of a Log of oil] would go to the owner of the olives.

וזה אומר ארצי גידלה יחלוקו – In the Gemara (Bava Metzia 101a), it establishes it as in the case where a river swept away the olives with their clods [of earth], that is, with the ground that is surrounding them that they are able to live through it, and because of that, they are exempt from Orlah (i.e. the prohibition of eating the fruit of trees of the first three years), and all the first three years is when they would divide it between them, for even though the land of this one grew them, nevertheless, if not for their clods [of earth], one would not be able to eat from them because of [the laws of] Orlah. But after the first three years, everything [belongs] to the owner of the ground, for he said to him: If had planted it, after three [years], I would not have been able to eat of them.

המשכיר בית לחבירו – undefined.

This mishnah deals with how much warning a landlord must give his tenant before evicting him.

בימות הגשמים אינו יכול להוציאו מן החג ועד הפסח ובימות החמה שלשים יום – that is to say, if he comes to remove/evict him prior to Passover, that he must inform him thirty days from the days of the summer/heat, that is from the fifteenth of Elul for from there is thirty days until Sukkot/”the holiday” which is the beginning of the days of rainfall, and if he did not inform him from the fifteenth of Elul, he cannot evict him until Passover, and automatically we learn that he who rents a house, undefined, in the days of the summer/heat, he must inform him thirty days before he removes/evicts him (Bava Metzia 101b).

If one leased a house to his fellow in the rainy season, he cannot make him leave it [during the time] from Sukkot to Pesach. In the summer, [he must give him] thirty days [warning]. And in large cities, whether it is during the rainy season or the summer [he must give] twelve months [warning]. If he rented him a house in the winter, he cannot evict him from Sukkot (approximately October) till Pesach (approximately April). In Israel, where the Mishnah was composed, this is the rainy season. Since it would be difficult for the tenant to find a new house in the rainy season, and difficult for him to move while it is wet outside, he may not be evicted during this entire period. If it was during the summer and the house was rented in a small town, he need give him only 30 days warning before evicting him. If, however, he was in a large city he must give him 12 months warning. The assumption is that it will be more difficult to find new housing in a larger city where more people live.

ובכרכים – For everyone is drawn there to live and homes are not found to rent, he must inform him twelve months prior to evicting/removing him, whether during the days of summer/heat, whether during the rainy season, and just as he who rents out a home must inform him, so the renter must inform him (i.e., the owner) – in the villages thirty days and in the walled cities twelve months. And if he does not inform him, he cannot leave, but rather gives him his rent.

[If one leased] a shop [to his fellow], whether in large cities or small towns, [he must give] twelve months [warning]. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If it is a shop occupied by bakers or dyers [he must give] three years [warning]. If he rented him a store he must always give him twelve months, even during the summer in a small town (where if he had rented him a house he need only give thirty days warning). The reason is that a storekeeper needs time to collect his debts from his customers. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel points out that bakers and dyers will need three years warning. A likely reason for the need for such a long warning is that it is very difficult for a baker or dyer to move his equipment and find new accommodations.

Questions for Further Thought:
Mishnah six: After whose interests is this mishnah concerned? The landlord or his tenant?

של נחתומים ושל צבעים שלש שנים – because of the great credit for a long time. And the Halakha is according to Rabban Gamaliel.

ובנגר – When they lock the door and insert it into the beam of the lintel.

Introduction The final three mishnayoth of chapter eight continue to deal with the laws of renting houses. Mishnah seven deals with what “extras” are included in the standard rental of a house. Mishnah eight deals with a person who rents a house for a year and the year ends up being a leap year, which in the Hebrew calendar has an extra month. Mishnah nine deals with the obligation of the landlord to provide his tenant with a new house should the old one fall.

הזבל של בעל הבית – like when the dung is made from bulls that came on their own, for if they were the bulls of the renter, the dung belongs to the renter.

If one rented a house to his fellow, he is obligated to provide it with a door, a bolt a lock and anything which is the work of a craftsman. However, that which is not the work of a craftsman, the tenant must make himself. When a landlord rents a house to someone he is obligated to provide the house with a door, a bolt and a lock and any other type of accoutrement which is customarily part of the house and is the work of a craftsman. An example might be the beams to support the walls or the handles to open the windows. The assumption is that since these are customarily part of the house and the tenant could not make them by himself, the owner is obligated to do so. An example in our day might be a toilet or a sink. One who rents a house certainly expects it to have a toilet and a sink, and if it did not he could probably obligate the landlord to build one. Anything which is not the work of a craftsman, must be provided by the tenant himself. Examples of these might be a ladder to reach the second story or a railing around the roof. Since these are simple to make, the expectation is that the tenant will make them himself.

היוצא מן התנור – ashes and they became dung.

The manure [which collects in the courtyard] belongs to the owner of the house, and the tenant can only claim the refuse from the oven and the stove. In the time of the mishnah the courtyard was shared by several householders and it was used for many purposes, such as cooking, laundry, etc. There was a custom that on market days, those who came to town from the neighboring villages would bring their animals into other people’s courtyards and buy food and drink there, as if the courtyard was a temporary inn. Since we can assume that the animal owner himself would not bother to carry the animal’s manure back to his village, the issue of the ownership over the manure left by these animals needs to be clarified. According to the mishnah it belongs to the owner of the house and not to his tenant. Although the tenant provided the food and drink for the animal, the manure does not become his. The only waste-product that the tenant does get to keep are the ashes from the stove and oven. Note: manure was used to fertilize the fields. Ashes were also used to fertilize the fields as well as other uses, including medicinal.

נתעברה לשוכר – he would not increase the monthly payment, for the intercalation is included in the year.

If one rented a house to his fellow by the year and the year was made a leap year, the extra month goes to the tenant. If he rented it by the month and the year was made a leap year, the extra month goes to the owner. It once happened in Tzippori that a person leased a bath-house from his fellow at “twelve golden dinars a year, one dinar per month”, and [when the year became a leap year] the case came before Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel and Rabbi Yose, and they said: “Let them share the extra month.” In the time of the mishnah there was no fixed calendar as we have in our day. Rather each year they would decide whether to make a leap year of 13 months or not. The Hebrew months are lunar months, of either 28 or 29 days, making a total of 354 days per year. Since this is 11 days short or a regular solar year, the Hebrew year must receive an additional month about once every three years. If one leased a house by a yearly wage and the year became a leap year, the tenant benefits by receiving an extra month for free. Since the terms of the contract were for a year, the tenant receives a year, whether it is a leap year or not. If, however, he leased the house by the month, and the year became a leap year, he must pay for the extra month. In the story (1c), the rental agreement for the bath-house contained ambiguous language, stating both the yearly rate and the monthly rate. Since it was unclear whether the owner had rented the house on a yearly or monthly rate, they split the cost of the extra month.

מעשה בציפורי – In the Gemara (Bava Metzia 102b), it raises an objection. You quote a story which disproves your rule! For the first part of the Mishnah teaches either it all goes to the renter or all goes to the person who rents it out, and it brings a story/case where they should divide it, and it responds that the Mishnah is deficient and it should be read as follows: If he said to him: “I rent it to you] for twelve golden denarii per year, at a golden dinar per month, they must divide/share it between them. And we don’t know if he seized the first language or the latter language, and the story also, etc. But the Halakha is not according the Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel or like Rabbi Yosi, but one goes after the least of these languages, that the land is in the possession of its owner stands. Therefore, all of it is [belongs] to the person renting out, whether the first language was less whether the latter language was less.

חייב להעמיד לו בית – [for the days of his rental].

If one rented a house to his fellow and it fell down, the owner must build him a new house. If it was small he may not make it larger, and if it was large he may not make it smaller. If it was one house, he may not make it two; if it was two houses he may not make it one. He may not reduce or increase the number of windows, unless it is with both of their consent. If one rented a house to another person and the house fell down he must build him a new house that is basically the same as the previously rented house. He may neither add nor detract from the size of the house. The renter may have specifically rented a small house and may not want a larger house. If he rented a house with one room (1b) he may not split the house into two rooms or build a one room house if the former was two rooms. Nor may he increase or decrease the number of windows. Since in all of these cases a person might prefer the other option, the owner is obligated to build the same type of house that was previously rented. If, however, the tenant agrees to a change and the owner agrees as well, they may of course make any change they wish.

היה גדול לא יעשנו קטן וכו' – and he that showed him a house and said to him (i.e. the prospective renter): “a house like this one I will rent out to you,” but when he provides the house and says to him: “this house I am renting out to you,” and it falls, he is not liable to build it. But if he said to him an undefined/unspecified, he must provide him a place that is called a house, whether it is large or small.